代写论文：独立董事
考虑到这些被勒的能力被提出问题的原因是所谓的独立悖论的问题。独立的悖论在这样的情况下产生了这样的情况，即从实际的信息源中删除了已控制的信息，以及这些信息的原因和影响。与其他董事不同的是，他们可能不是信息的来源，也可能是信息的接收者，而不是参与制作信息的人。正如研究人员Long et al(2005)所言，这些人经常参与信息和事件，但从一个被删除的国家中，他们只是信息的执行解释器。这种经常被忽视的观点可能会让他们更不了解本组织目前的财务状况。然而，不仅是在工作场所使用的信息，还有现实中的信息，在现实中，关于不应该做什么是矛盾的一部分。那些期望董事们以某种方式行事的管理委员会，应该更大程度地承担必要的条款和指导。其次，在公司治理问题日益增多的背景下，关于治理委员会必须如何改变或承担责任的问题，再次出现了问题。ASXCGPs清晰的原则2指出,“(一)多数董事会…应该独立董事”(ASX,2014)。在这里，期望大多数董事都是独立董事，而没有恰当地解释为什么这种独立董事的形式应该如何发挥作用。
代写论文：独立董事
Considering some of the reasons why the capabilities of the INED have been brought into question are that of the issues of what is called the independent paradox. The independent paradox results in such cases where the INED is seen to be removed from the actual information source and the cause and effect of such information. An INED unlike the other directors might not be at the source of information, or they might be the receiver of the information and not a person involved in the making of the information. As researchers Long et al (2005) present these are people who are often involved in information and events but from a removed state making them just executive interpreters of the information. This often times removed standpoint might make them even less aware of the current financial state of the organization . However, it is not just the information that is seen to be in use in the workplace but also the information in reality on what is present about what the INEDs are expected to do that is part of the paradox. The very governance councils that expect the directors to act in a certain way should be tasked more heavily on presenting the needed provisions and guidance’s for acting so. Secondly in the context of increasing corporate governance issues, there are once again questions on how the governance board must act how they must be change or be charged with responsibilities. The principle 2 of the ASXCGPs clearly states that “[a] majority of the board… should be independent directors” (ASX, 2014). Here to expect most of the directors to be independent directors without properly defining why and how this form of independent directorship should work might not be that effective.
